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Party Finance Reform as Constitutional engineering? The effectiveness and unintended 
consequences of Party Finance Reform in France and Britain  
 
Abstract 
In both Britain and France, party funding was traditionally characterised by a laissez 
faire approach and a conspicuous lack of regulation. In France this was tantamount to 
a „legislative vacuum‟. In the last two decades, however, both countries have sought 
to fundamentally reform their political finance regulation regimes. This prompted, in 
Britain, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and in France a 
bout of „legislative incontinence‟ – profoundly transforming the political finance 
regime between 1988 and 1995. This article seeks to explore and compare the impacts 
of the reforms in each country in a bid to explain the unintended consequences of the 
alternative paths taken and the effectiveness of the new party finance regime in each 
country. It finds that constitutional engineering through party finance reform is a 
singularly inexact science, largely due to the imperfect nature of information, the 
limited predictability of cause and effect, and the constraining influence of non-party 
actors, such as the Constitutional Council in France, and the Electoral Commission in 
Britain. 
 
Keywords: France; Britain; Party funding; constitutional engineering; unintended 
consequences. 
 
Introduction 
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Ideas about „constitutional engineering‟ have been widely applied to electoral system reform 
(Sartori 1997; Taagepera and Shugart 1989), but much less to reforms in party funding and 
political finance, despite the fact that such changes profoundly affect the relative strengths 
and advantages of political parties. Whilst it is true that all constitutional engineering is an 
inexact science, it is surely particularly true in an area of democratic institutional change that 
has received relatively limited attention. Much work on party funding has focused on the 
origins of reform and the rationale underpinning reforms (see for example: Hopkin, 2004; 
Clift and Fisher, 2004; Scarrow, 2004; van Biezen, 2004). Whilst these are clearly important 
aspects of party funding, this can lead to neglect of an equally vital concern – namely the 
impacts of party funding reform. It is these impacts that are the focus of this article.  
  
We analyse here on cases of France and Britain. Both are mature advanced (post-) industrial 
democracies, each with majoritarian party systems.  Prior to party finance reforms, both had 
similar laissez faire traditions and unregulated arrangements for party funding. In the case of 
Britain, until February 2001 when the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 
came into force, the funding regime was still shaped by the Corrupt and Illegal Practices 
(Prevention) Act 1883. Similarly, in France, in the first thirty years after the formation of the 
Fifth Republic, party funding had not been the subject of any legislative attention. Indeed, 
one initial hurdle to overcome in party funding reform was that parties in Britain and France 
were not even recognised as legal entities. As a consequence, a most similar systems design 
is the appropriate way to approach the comparative analysis presented here (Przeworski and 
Teune 1970).  
 
This article seeks to compare the impacts and outcomes of the reform processes in each 
country. Having set out the analytical framework in relation to constitutional engineering, we 
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establish the background to reform in both cases before comparing the initial French 
propositions with the British reforms, and briefly summarising the key instruments of party 
funding reform - donations, disclosure, campaign ceilings, and state funding. Subsequently, 
comparative analyses seek to explain the unintended consequences of the different paths 
taken and the effectiveness of party finance regulation in each country.  
 
What emerges from our analysis is the contingent quality of the policy regime‟s evolution, 
mediated by paradigms – notably voluntarism,1 but also state funding, and in the French case 
the etatiste tradition. Furthermore, unintended consequences are a pervasive feature of the 
experiences of reform in each country. This is at least in part explicable in terms of the 
imperfection of the information on which reform strategies were based. Another prevalent 
aspect of reform is a „strategic learning‟ process whereby subsequent reforms react to the 
impacts of earlier changes, illustrating the policy makers‟ roles as reflexive agents.  
 
Party Funding Reform and Constitutional Engineering 
 
The processes of institutional reform, in our cases, were driven by questions surrounding the 
ability of pre-existing institutional framework to „deliver‟ appropriate political behaviour. 
The catalyst for change was the undermining of the legitimacy of the political finance regime, 
precipitating – to different degrees – political crises. Change occurred in part because rules 
no longer conferred legitimacy. Political behaviour was judged against (and found to be 
                                                 
1
 Voluntarism here refers to a laissez faire approach to political finance characterised by 
reliance upon voluntary support for political parties rather than state aid. Historically this has 
been accompanied by minimal state involvement and regulation. This should not be confused 
with (indeed it contrasts with) the French term volontarisme, referring to an activist, 
interventionist economic policy approach which places emphasis on the discretionary actions 
of state policy-makers.  
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performing „sub optimally‟ in relation to) democratic probity, fairness and transparency. In 
efficiency terms, both sets of funding sources and networks, it could be argued, were 
functional to the political system in allocating resources (though see Fisher, 2000b). 
However, the perceived dysfunctionality of the system had spawned a tangible gap between 
the internal values of the funding regime and external values of French and British 
democracy. The degree of perceived crisis was greater in the French case, and the scale of 
change more radical, yet it does not necessarily follow that the effectiveness of these changes 
was greater. 
 
Perhaps the most significant theoretical exposition of constitutional engineering as applied to 
party finance comes in the context of Katz and Mair setting out their „ideal type‟ of the Cartel 
Party. This thesis assumes, on the part of parties, the ability „to manipulate the state in its own 
interest‟, specifically, by pursuing „the provision and regulation of state subventions to 
political parties‟ (Katz and Mair 1995: 14 and 15). They continue  
 
„precisely because these subventions are often tied to prior party performance or 
position, they help ensure the maintenance of existing parties while at the same time 
posing barriers to the emergence of new groups … the state, which is invaded by 
parties, and the rules of which are determined by parties, becomes a fount of 
resources through which these parties not only help ensure their survival, but through 
which they can also enhance their capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized 
alternatives. The state, in this sense, becomes becomes an institutionalized structure 
of support, sustaining insiders while excluding outsiders‟ (Katz and Mair 1995: 15-
16) 
 
There are a number of underlying assumptions here which need to be unpicked for the 
purposes of the argument presented here. Firstly, the Katz and Mair thesis assumes a high 
degree of party control over the reform process, to use their phrase, an almost complete 
„inter-penetration of party and state‟ (1995: 17). This may run the risk of under-playing the 
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role of non-party actors within the state, such as, in our cases, the Electoral Commission and 
the Committee on Standards in Public Life in Britain, or the Constitutional Council in France. 
 
A second assumption is the predictability of cause and effect of regarding party manipulation 
of regulations and subventions. As recent research shows – the effects of party funding 
changes are by no means uniform– and each depend on the precise nature of the instruments 
used, the thresholds established, and who are identified as the recipients of state support 
(Pierre et al 2000).   
 
Following on from this, a third assumption is that reformers are basing their constitutional 
engineering through party funding regulation on something approaching perfect information. 
Implicit assumptions of perfect information are less than convincing in the case of party 
finance reform. The knowledge on which strategic calculations are based is arguably 
impressionistic and partial at best. This point is all the more pertinent to our substantive area 
– political finance reform, since it presents a non-extensively researched arena in which to 
attempt constitutional engineering. Care must be taken not to understate the complexity of the 
reform process, nor to overestimate the ability of actors to discern and achieve their goals. 
 
Constitutional engineering through party funding reform has only a limited body of empirical 
evidence on which to base its blueprints, thus how groups concoct solutions, and how they 
are implemented may be subject to accident or error. Moreover, change cannot be controlled 
precisely and the long-term policy-impact of institutional changes is often unknown or highly 
uncertain (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 22). A good example in political finance terms is the 
Trade Union Act 1984, which required unions with political funds to engage in periodic 
ballots to approve the continued existence of the fund. Some saw this as a deliberate attempt 
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to financially enfeeble the Labour Party. In fact, the outcome was that all unions voted to 
continue with political funds, and some unions adopted political funds for the first time. As a 
consequence, trade unions became more politicised rather than less (Fisher, 1992). 
 
Finally, the Cartel Party thesis assumes a high degree of effectiveness of the „cartelised‟ 
regime introduced (to ensure „insider‟ parties are not really financially hurt by electoral 
losses, and therefore electoral „feedback‟ effects are blunted). As shall be seen from the 
comparative analysis presented below, none of these assumptions is entirely safe in the light 
of the evidence from the British and French cases.  
 
Another important consideration when assessing the impact of party finance reforms in terms 
of their unintended consequences is the reflexivity of the actors. Institutions constrain and 
shape the desires and motives of agents, but agents‟ „inter-subjective‟ construction of 
structures enables them in turn to reshape institutions. Thus, „actors are strategic, seeking to 
realize complex, contingent and often changing goals. They do so in a context which favours 
certain strategies over others and must rely on perceptions of that context which are at best 
incomplete and which may very often reveal themselves to be inaccurate.‟ (Hay and Wincott 
1998: 954) Thus party funding reform involves a process of social learning. This is 
particularly significant in relation to the rolling programme of reform in France, where 
strategically selective actors shape and reshape the institutional parameters of their party 
finance regime as the impacts of earlier reforms become evident. 
 
Background to Reform 
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The section that follows establishes the background to reform in both cases, and the rationale 
underpinning it. The key instruments of party funding reform in our cases - donations, 
disclosure, campaign ceilings, and state funding, are placed within this context.  
 
The Rousseauian suspicion of „intermediary‟ interests („partial wills‟), which represents one 
strand of the Republican tradition, finds expression in the Fifth Republic constitution of 1958. 
Although mentioned in article 4, parties‟ activities were completely unregulated and they 
were simply unrecognised in law. So powerful was the laissez faire tradition in relation to 
parties that, until 1988, no rules or laws existed regarding political finance. Party funding 
was, however, indirectly (and ineffectually) regulated by the law on abus de biens sociaux 
(see Table 1).  Similarly, in Britain, a general lack of regulation has been a pervasive feature 
of British party finance. That said, campaign spending ceilings have existed since 1883, 
though critically, until the 2000 Act, they applied only at constituency level. They were 
originally designed in response to a perception that election expenditure had become 
excessive  - concerns that were mirrored when expenditure caps were introduced at national 
level. 
 
A second characteristic of French party funding flowing from this lack of regulation, and 
from the fact that state aids were minimal, was a reliance on voluntary income by French 
political parties. French parties claimed (perhaps unreliably)
1
 to derive most of their funding 
from membership dues. This reliance upon voluntary donations had also been a long running 
theme in British party finance, and whilst the sources of funding parties (e.g. party members, 
individual donors, companies, trade unions) have evolved over time, the emphasis on 
voluntary donations underlined the eventual reforms with the rejection of comprehensive 
state funding. Only the paucity of regulation has really changed in British party finance. Prior 
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to the 2000 reforms, there were no limits on party income and reporting regulations were very 
limited. 
 
A third tradition of French party funding also flowed from the legal vacuum, which presented 
an „open door to corruption‟ (Miguet 1999), and was compounded by very limited state 
support. This was the tradition that French parties tended to be dependent upon corrupt (or as 
the French term them „occult‟) financing networks, channelled through their local elected 
officials.  Such practices in the French case may be contrasted with British traditions of 
political finance.  
 
Part of the explanation may be derived from another significant difference. French parties are 
weakly embedded in civil society, with comparatively low membership levels (Knapp 2002). 
Claims regarding membership funding, although never true, had become decreasingly 
credible as costs of electoral campaigning increased in the media age, with the increased use 
of professionalised political marketing, advertising and public relations experts and 
commercial polling firms (Clift 2005: 236-8; Knapp 2002: 128).  In the period before 
regulations formalising information gathering about party finance were introduced in 1988, 
evidence is accordingly limited. However, all parties used „occult‟ business funding, one 
prevalent means was fictitious „consultancy‟ work for which firms bidding for public 
contracts would pay parties. The PS‟s URBA consultancy was the most formalised and 
rationalised conduit for such financing, established in the early 1970s. Its discovery in 1989 
led to a large number of prosecutions of politicians, both Socialists and others.
2
  
 
Analysts concur that all the major parties used such funding methods (Avril 1994: 86-9; 
Knapp 2002: 124-5; Miguet 1998: 55; Pujas and Rhodes 1999: 43 and 52-3). Once data 
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began to be collected, it became clear how limited a proportion of party finance actually came 
from the membership. The National Commission on Campaign Accounts and Political 
Finance (CNCCFP) reported in 1995 that membership subscriptions accounted for a very 
small proportion of parties‟ total income – for example PS (12 per cent) PCF (14.5 per cent) 
FN (10.9 per cent) (CNCCFP 1996). Such reports exposed the myth that these sources are 
sufficient to fund party activity in France.
3
 
 
In Britain, by way of contrast, the practices, as well as the principle of voluntary donations 
created fewer difficulties. Following the shift form individual donations to institutional ones 
as a means of supporting the two main parties (the Conservatives and Labour) in the 1920s, 
there were no substantiated political finance scandals and a broad „consensus‟ emerged 
whereby the principal sources of funds were companies (for the Conservatives) and trade 
unions (for Labour). This „consensus‟ came under challenge with the re-emergence of large 
individual donations in the 1990s as well as the growth of smaller parties – particularly the 
Liberal Democrats – who had no traditional institutional base for their party income. The 
result, whilst not revealing any political finance scandals on the scale experienced in France, 
was that disquiet began to emerge regarding the probity of the voluntary system, as well as its 
continued ability to fund party politics adequately. 
 
With these similarities and differences in the reform contexts in mind, we turn briefly to the 
rationale (and intended consequences) of party reform processes in each country. 
 
France: Rationale for Reform  
 
Although party finance legislation had been on the political agenda before – with 29 
propositions de loi on party finance between 1970 and 1988, the political will had always 
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been lacking to push through such measures (Doublet 1997: 60). The catalyst for change in 
the party finance regime was the scale and reach of political corruption scandals. Throughout 
1987, increasing number of scandals were emerging, implicating senior members of the 
French Socialist elite, including former Ministers and members of Mitterrand‟s entourage. 
The impact of these scandals was reinforced by the degree of media attention afforded them. 
The desire to fill the legislative and regulatory „vacuum‟ as a means of tackling such political 
corruption was compounded by tactical manoeuvring ahead of the upcoming 1988 
presidential elections. In November 1987, in the wake of the Luchaire affair,
4
 Mitterrand 
called upon the Chirac government proposed to legislate to regulate party finance, both as a 
means of being seen to respond to tackle corruption within the Socialist camp, and to put the 
Gaullists on the back foot, given their own heavy reliance on such „occult‟ funding sources. 
Raymond Barre, for this reason, also championed the call for party finance regulation. Chirac 
was thus somewhat manoeuvred into orchestrating the party funding reform project. 
 
The reforms instigated, and the previous positions, are shown in Table 1. We can identify a 
number of strands. Firstly, two pieces of legislation offered a fresh start in the form of an 
amnesty covering all prior dubious practices. The idea was to draw a „line in the sand‟ under 
practices which, it was well known, politicians from all parties had long been engaged (as we 
shall see later, this was less than wholly successful). Mitterrand‟s post-presidential election 
amnesty of 1988 was followed up by a more blatant bid to save Socialist blushes when a 
further amnesty was written into the 1990 law with the specific intent of saving Christian 
Nucci from prosecution for his part in the “Carrefour du développement” scandal.5 
Somewhat curiously, only the Communist Party objected to this, and the law was passed with 
the compliance of Right, illustrating what Katz and Mair term „inter-party collusion‟ (1995: 
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17), and an intermittent conspiracy of laxity amongst the major French parties regarding the 
punishment of dubious party funding. 
 
Secondly, the overall aim was to increase „financial transparency‟ surrounding party finances 
and donations to parties. (CNCCFP 1992, 9) Thirdly, in tandem with greater transparency, 
caps were introduced to place limits on the amount any one company or individual could 
contribute to any one candidate or party. Socialist aspirations in 1988 for tighter regulation, 
lower caps or even elimination of private financing (since this would hurt the Gaullists more 
than them) were not realised. In the end they abstained in the vote on the first (1988) law, in 
part over the minor issue of objecting to tax deductibility of donations. 
 
Fourthly, business finance, which had hitherto been de jure illegal in France (although, de 
facto widespread), was legalised 1993, in a bid by „realists‟ to bring „occult‟ funding into the 
light. This despite strident opposition from Pierre Joxe, author of the 1990 law (1997).  
Fifthly, parties received (quite generous) public funding, which was scaled up as the reform 
process progressed – not only at election times, but also for running costs between elections. 
In the run up to passing the 1988 legislation, the Socialists complained vehemently that the 
state subsidies were being introduced in such a way as to disproportionately favour the RPR 
and UDF at the expense of the PS and others. The PC and FN voted against the 1988 law, and 
the PS abstained in part for this reason.
6
 However, these attempts to cartelise the French party 
system through manipulation of state subsidies system fell foul of French constitutional 
principles of equality, and the need to promote democratic pluralism in the expression of 
opinions and ideas.  
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Rulings of the Constitutional Council, notably in January 1990, forced legislators make 
specific provisions (particularly in the 1995 legislation) to help small and emerging parties to 
ensure they did not ignore „the demands of pluralism of ideas and opinions which constitutes 
the foundation of democracy‟. Specifically, the Constitutional Council ruled the 5 per cent 
threshold which barred access of smaller parties to funding to be unconstitutional.
7
 Thus the 
guiding principles underpinning increasing state funding were the need to balance equality 
and proportionality – a desire for funding to reflect support for parties; balanced against a 
desire for „fairness‟ to minor parties. This was rooted in the French model of multi-party 
liberal democracy. Political finance, it was felt, must be not only open and transparent, but 
„fair‟ – in the sense of being subject to a cap and some financial „affirmative action‟ 
preventing extreme inequalities of expenditure between parties. This provision had to grapple 
with the risk of abuse if thresholds for access to state funding dropped too low. Significantly, 
a later Constitutional Council decision explicitly stated that it had not ruled that thresholds 
themselves were unconstitutional, but only that the 5  per cent threshold had been too high.
8
 
 
Between 1988 and 1995, the rationale underpinning the reforms process developed to plug 
gaps, close loopholes, in some cases to open loopholes, and tackle unforeseen consequences. 
Such insertion of loopholes and intentional laxity into the rolling programme of reform 
clearly illustrates a degree of „strategic learning‟ by „knowledgeable and reflexive [actors 
who] routinely (and often intuitively) monitor the consequences of their action‟ (Hay and 
Wincott 1998: 956). Impetus for further reform came from the political corruption scandals 
which emerged regularly, and received much media attention, throughout the period of 
reform.  One key shift was to attempt to eradicate the link between private sector business 
interests and political parties and candidates by outlawing once more business funding in 
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1995. Political finance should be, it was felt, free from business interests, and – in part as a 
corollary of this - underwritten by the state to a significant extent.  
 
Former „occult‟ funding networks channelled through local officials have by no means 
disappeared, and party funding scandals are still being uncovered and investigated (although 
most pertain to the period before 1995).
9
 Thus, to some extent, the spirit of unregulated party 
finance endures within the French regime. However, the powerful etatiste element within the 
French republican tradition now qualifies and counter-balances this, with the state financing 
on a significant scale and the requirement of parties to submit annual accounts. 
 
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
Britain: Rationale for Reform 
Any discussion of reform in the areas of parties or indeed elections in Britain must take at 
least some account of the dominant so-called „Westminster‟ model of democracy. Whilst 
constitutional changes in the post 1997 period (particularly with reference to devolution) have 
challenged this up to a point, it is fair to argue that this remains the dominant model. Thus, 
the basis upon which the party system is conceived implies a comfort with the principle of 
there being two dominant parties, with smaller parties being a feature of the system, but not 
one that is encouraged in any sense of affirmative action by the state. There are several 
striking examples of the continued dominance of these ideals. In the Jenkins review of 
alternative electoral systems there was a stated desire to avoid the „coalition habit‟ (Margetts 
and Dunleavy, 1999). Moreover, in the subsequent proposed electoral system change in this 
review, and in the systems introduced for the devolved institutions of Scotland and Wales, the 
degree of proportionality introduced ensured that the party systems did not move too 
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radically away from the Westminster norm. The two notable exceptions to this model have 
been the electoral systems introduced for the European elections and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. In the latter, STV was used precisely to attempt to broaden the political 
perspective of the Assembly. In fact, the reverse happened following the 2003 elections. 
Nevertheless, despite these apparent anomalies, the Westminster model is arguably still 
dominant. 
 
As we have seen, three other principles have traditionally characterised British political 
finance: campaign spending ceilings, voluntarism in party income and a general lack of 
regulation. Only the paucity of regulation has really changed in British party finance. Prior to 
the 2000 reforms, there were no limits on party income and reporting regulations were very 
limited. The latter has changed considerably. Yet whilst foreign donations have been banned 
and corporate donations now require prior shareholder approval, the tradition of uncapped 
donations remains. In that sense, the spirit of unregulated party finance endures. 
 
Overall, these traditions shaped both the operations of political finance and attempts at its 
reform throughout the twentieth century. As Fisher (2000a) shows, despite the periodic 
examination from the 1970s onwards, what characterised previous attempts at reform was 
their failure to fundamentally change a system based largely upon nineteenth century 
regulation. And, though the 2000 Act represented a comparatively significant change, Clift 
and Fisher (2004) nevertheless demonstrate that their fingerprints can also be seen on the 
reform process itself, shaping the path of development. The reforms instigated and the 
previous positions are shown in Table 2. These reforms were introduced for a variety of 
reasons, but principal reason was the disjuncture between optimal notions of behaviour and 
what actually occurred was growing (Clift and Fisher, 2004).  
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Whilst no actual cases of corruption were proven, there were increasing concerns about the 
size and source of some donations, neither of which were regulated. Thus, whilst parties were 
behaving legally, the disjuncture between the „logic of appropriateness‟ (March and Olsen 
1984: 741; 1989: 21-6) of British party democracy and existing behaviour meant that the 
party funding regime was seen as illegitimate.  In addition, there were other pressures, 
namely the increasing cost of politics and significant changes in the party finance community. 
There were changes in both the dominant sources of income as well as new actors offering 
newly legitimate inputs into debates about reform.  The resulting reforms were all attempts to 
deal with these problems: transparency and a ban on foreign donations to address the sub-
optimal performance of the institution, and national spending caps to suppress the increasing 
costs and therefore the need to generate ever more income. In addition, the modest increase in 
state funding was an attempt to address the shortfall in parties‟ abilities to adequately fulfil 
their functions. 
 
For all that, however, many of the existing traditions continued to shape the newly regulated 
institution. First, no attempt was made to challenge the dominant Westminster model. As 
Fisher (2001) shows, whilst the introduction of national campaign spending limits could have 
been seen as an attempt to narrow the spending disparity between the larger and smaller 
parties, the level was set at such a point that it barely made any difference. Secondly, the use 
of spending ceilings as an instrument to counteract apparent electoral inequality was a tried 
and tested policy instrument first utilised in the nineteenth century. Thirdly, the modest 
extension of state finance helped serve to maintain the existing dominant party system, whilst 
maintaining the traditions of voluntarism in British politics. State funding was rejected 
precisely because it was felt that parties should be funded primarily by their supporters. Only 
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in the area of lack of regulation was there real change, though this stopped short of regulating 
the size of donations. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Comparative analysis: Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences. 
 
France 
 
Disclosure 
The National Commission on Campaign Accounts and Political Finance (CNCCFP) was 
established by the January 1990 Law to oversee the process of subjecting financial affairs of 
parties and elected officials to increased transparency and audit.  The 1990 law tightened the 
1988 disclosure restrictions, and these have proved partially effective.
10
 The legalisation and 
regulation of corporate funding in 1990 sought to change the norms, and the „logic of 
appropriateness‟ underpinning French political finance. However, greater emphasis on 
transparency within the reform process has considerable limitations. The compulsion to 
publish accounts and name donors may do little to prevent a whole series of dubious practices 
that do not turn up on the balance sheet.
11
 Strategic learning by actors resulted in loophole 
seeking, which has undermined attempts to control donations from both individuals and 
firms. „Personal‟ capital contributions by candidates to their own campaign (which are not 
subject to strict disclosure rules) increased fivefold between 1992 and 1995 (68 per cent of 
total receipts) (Doublet 1997b: 104). This loophole has the effect of blunting the transparency 
tool.
12
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A still more debilitating limitation is article 4 of the 1958 Constitution, guaranteeing party 
freedom, preventing the Commission from investigating parties, or commenting on 
appropriateness of spending. The laissez faire strand of France‟s Republican tradition, has 
served to undermine the effectiveness of these dimensions of French political finance reform. 
Despite the best intentions of the CNCCFP to „ensure the transparency of financial 
operations‟ of parties and candidates in electoral campaigns (CNCCFP 1992: 25), the well-
established occlusion of French political finance proved too resilient. Thus the reform process 
has had the perverse unintended consequence of conferring a spurious air of legitimacy on 
political funding in France,
13
 since parties and candidates can point to the submission of their 
accounts and their campaign returns as evidence of having „cleaned up their acts‟ – but 
Doublet goes so far as to describe the transparency as „illusory‟ (1997b 104). 
 
Donations and Business funding 
 
As Table 1 shows, in 1988, donations to candidates (but not to parties) were limited. This 
loophole transformed parties into „screens‟ to exceed ceilings on donations to candidates, 
contrary to spirit of law (CNCCFP 1992: 26-30). An ambiguity also remained surrounding 
party financing from companies (Miguet 1999: 58-9). The 1990 law
14
 legalised (and 
regulated) business funding for the first time. Thereafter, parties encountered financial 
difficulties, indicating heavy prior reliance on business funding. As Knapp notes, the 1993 
election campaign is instructive, as it was the only one where business funding was at least 
partially openly declared.
15
 Three quarters of declared corporate finance came from firms 
involved in bidding for public contracts, suggesting that, „the brief emergence into legality of 
corporate donations merely drew back the veil on earlier illegal practices.‟(2002: 125-6) 
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However, in the wake of further scandals, the 1995 law made business funding illegal once 
more.  
 
The design of the regime to regulate donations was, at times, shame-facedly self-serving. The 
CNCCFP had, in 1992, described the proliferation of „groups of a political character, 
designed to promote a candidates personal image‟ and raise funds for their campaigns as 
„against the spirit of the law‟ because they have „the effect of circumventing the ceilings on 
donations‟ (CNCCFP 1992: 26). However, Prime Minister Balladur, whose 1995 presidential 
campaign suffered from a lack of party resources, since the Rassemblement Pour la 
République (RPR) was mobilized primarily behind Chirac, promoted an amendment enabling 
the creation of campaign support committees, similar to parties (and thus exempt from 
restrictions on donations to candidates). Balladur‟s campaign drew benefit from ninety-eight 
such „American style‟ committees (Doublet 1999: 74).  
 
Spending Ceilings and the Level Playing Field 
 
The 1988 campaign ceilings included all „tacitly‟ agreed spending on candidates‟ behalf, but 
not by them (Joxe 1997: 14). However, the phrase „even tacit‟ was removed in December 
1994, a move which, Joxe regretfully noted, „was intended to render the ceiling inoperable‟ 
(1997: 14). With these „tacit‟ expenses now falling outside the ceiling, the ceiling became 
ineffectual, as the Constitutional Council pointed out.
16
 Such insertion of loopholes and 
intentional laxity into the rolling programme of reform illustrates a degree of strategic 
learning. It also suggests that attempts to eradicate „occult‟ funding ultimately failed. 
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Underlying the imposition of a ceilings approach is a particular notion of a „level playing 
field‟ between competing parties, presupposing some degree of equality. In France this logic 
is carried still further, through „affirmative action‟ in the form of targeted state aid to help 
small and emerging political formations. Indeed, an initial threshold of 5 per cent for access 
to funding was ruled unconstitutional and abolished by the Constitutional Council. However, 
pre-existing norms of French political finance presented a significant obstacle to reform. 
Parties and candidates reliant upon „occult‟ funding networks were unwilling, perhaps 
unable, to break out. These networks, and the circumventions of regulatory frameworks and 
spending ceilings, mean the level playing field remains more myth than reality. 
 
State Funding 
 
Perhaps the most radical element of the French reforms, marking a break with the laissez 
faire past, has been the introduction and augmentation of state funding of political parties. As 
noted above, the Constitutional Council intervened decisively to ensure the principles of 
equality and proportionality shaped the introduction of state funding. The Council‟s declared 
unconstitutionality of the 5 per cent threshold, and shift (also encouraged by the 
Constitutional Council) in eligibility from fielding candidates in 75 to 50 constituencies is 
evidence of the power of the French traditional of multi-party democracy as a normative 
institution guiding the reform process. When, in 1995 business funding was made illegal, 
parties and candidates received a compensatory increase in state funding. The amount of 
electoral expenses reimbursed increased from 5 per cent to 50 per cent of the ceiling on 
expenditure. Yet even with this increase in public funding, which totalled 526.5m FF 
(€80.38m) in 1997, still the parties could not balance their books.  
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As noted above, Katz and Mair‟s „Cartel Party‟ thesis interprets the augmenting of party 
funding as evidence of the advancing inter-penetration of party and state; „the state … 
becomes an institutionalised structure of support, sustaining insiders and excluding outsiders‟ 
(1995: 16). This all assumes effective control over the funding reform process by parties. 
However, such assumptions do not hold in the French case where the Constitutional Council 
intervened to rule the 5 per cent threshold unconstitutional. As a result, specific provision to 
foster the development of small, emerging political currents and movements, and the 
recognition of the need for „affirmative action‟ in their favour, were integral to the French 
party finance reforms. Furthermore, predictions that cartelisation allows insider parties to 
minimise the costs of electoral defeat (Katz and Mair 1995: 23) have not been borne out in 
the French case. Powerful French insider parties such as the RPR and PS have been deeply 
adversely affected by electoral loss, forced into very severe spending cut-backs (Clift and 
Fisher 2004: 691 and 697). 
 
Although the intentions of making sure small, or emerging political formations have a chance 
is honourable enough, the constitutional ruling that the 5 per cent threshold was too high 
opened the door to opportunism and abuse. The specific provisions to help emergent parties 
contained in the 1995 legislation were, in hindsight, perhaps not exigent enough. Testament 
to attempts at opportunistic exploitation of the generosity of the party funding regime in 
France, the number of political parties grew from 29 in 1990 to 261 (48 of which received 
some state funding) in 1995. Political finance legislation, the CNCCFP‟s third report noted, 
„favours a multiplication of formation claiming the status of political parties, whilst their 
creation is sometimes motivated at least partially by the concern to benefit from direct 
financial aid.‟ (1996: 8; see also Doublet, 1997: 17 and 74; Miguet 1999: 72). 
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Thus the most dramatic unintended consequences of the up-scaling of sate funding, and of the 
insertion of „affirmative action‟ measures to empower smaller parties, has been to 
considerable exacerbate the fissiparous tendencies within a French party system which 
already unleashes powerful fragmentary pressures on parties. Parodi (1997) has noted that the 
candidate funding regime presents no barriers to minor parties or candidates, and acts to 
expand the number of candidates taking their place in the country‟s foremost political shop 
window. To borrow Parodi‟s analogy, the „electoral accordion‟ was opened to the fullest 
extent ever seen in the Fifth Republic in 2002 Presidential election, with a record 16 first 
round candidates. The French political funding regime, Duhamel argues, „transforms 
elections into financing mechanisms for political „start-ups‟, when it is a not a case of 
personal enrichment by flash-in-the-pan leaders‟ (Duhamel 2002). The same structural 
incentives towards fragmentation as bedevil the presidential elections are present in 
legislative elections with regard to campaign funding. The parliamentary elections, which 
followed in June 2002, saw a record 8,446 first round candidates (up 32 per cent from 1997) 
– an average of 15 per constituency. 
 
Britain 
Donations and Disclosure  
At the most basic level, the new Act introduced a degree of transparency into party donations 
that did not previously exist. However, far from transparency eliminating concerns about 
party finance, a series of problems clearly remain. First, both main parties continue to receive 
substantial donations - one of the concerns, which prompted legislation in the first place. 
Concerns about donations well in excess of £1 million (€1,502,000) prior to the 2001 
election, prompted the chair of the Electoral Commission to suggest that the question of 
donation caps might be re-examined in future just as the new legislation was coming into 
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force. This duly occurred, with the Electoral Commission conducting an enquiry into this and 
other aspects of party finance in 2004.  
 
Concerns also remain that preferential treatment has been given to donors. Four such 
episodes occurred in close succession during 2002 relating to Labour (Fisher, 2002). The 
Conservatives, too have experienced such questions in opposition (Fisher, 2004). In 
particular, the prominence of a major donor in debates about the party‟s leader in 2003 
appeared to suggest that financial gifts lead to political influence. Yet, while these episodes 
do not necessarily suggest that impropriety has taken place, they all have the potential to 
damage public confidence – especially when as here, they appear in close succession and 
thereby create a cumulative effect. As then Leader of the House, Peter Hain noted, press 
attention generated by the transparency can, at times, degenerate into the bizarre, citing the 
headline „Labour donor on speeding charge‟ (Hain, 2004: 14). So in a sense, the disclosure 
regulations may actually contribute to public disquiet. This clearly illustrates an unintended 
consequence of reform. By providing a wealth of new information in an attempt to allay 
public concern about probity in public life, the effect was in part at least to heighten the 
political sensitivity surrounding all donations. Paradoxically then, the transparency generated 
more concern rather than less, in part, because of the ways in which the media chose to report 
the newly available data.  
 
Spending Ceilings 
At the 2001 and 2005 General Elections, it is doubtful that the new spending caps made any 
decisive difference to party fortunes, especially as the spending gap between the main parties 
and the Liberal Democrats remained wide (Fisher, 2001, 2005). Instead, the principal impact 
was likely to have been one of changing the proportions spent on campaign items, rather than 
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levelling the electoral playing field. The new limit imposes opportunity costs. If one million was 
spent on A, then that was one million that could not be spent on B or C. Thus, parties had to 
review their spending in order that it should be most effective. Interestingly, the two main parties 
do not always concur on which campaign techniques are regarded as being most likely to 
accomplish their aims. Nevertheless, this did indicate some strategic learning by the parties. 
They were forced to evaluate the efficacy of different campaign techniques. 
 
Compliance 
Compliance with the new legislation in the first post-legislation election (2001) inevitably 
caused a few problems given the extent of the new regulations. To some extent these 
difficulties were anticipated by the Act. One-off start-up grants were made available to assist 
parties in meeting the costs of compliance. Nevertheless, local parties did face a few 
problems – particularly with the heavier workload, which accompanied the changes to postal 
voting, and rolling registration. Despite these difficulties, parties adapted well to the new 
regulations, overall. There were some uncertainties, notably the status of some forms of 
donations „in kind‟. That said, the indications since then are that the regulations, both in spirit 
and actuality, have broadly been observed, though in the run-up to the 2005 election, there were 
some indications that the spirit of the legislation may have begun to be challenged, with the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties apparently exploiting loopholes in reporting 
requirements. In both cases, whilst neither committed any breach of the legislation, they were in 
receipt of significant donations which on account of the point at which they were reported, 
ensured that their public declaration would occur after the election when the „political moment‟ 
had passed  (Fisher, 2005).  
 
State funding – back on the agenda? 
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Despite the new legislation, however, there continue to be concerns about the probity of party 
finance. Indeed, the regular appearance of these prompted some to call for further state 
funding – the expectation being that this would prevent such episodes. At the time of the 
original report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998, both the main parties 
concurred with the report‟s view that the time for state funding had not yet come. However, 
as a result of these episodes (and one suspects, the increased financial burden faced by parties 
following both general and devolved elections) both the Conservative and Labour parties now 
endorse an increase in the limited state funding, and in the case some senior Labour 
politicians, state funding comparable with other Western democracies. Critically however, 
neither Labour nor the Conservatives supports limiting the size of donations. 
 
On the one hand, this is a clear example of the unintended consequences of reform. On the 
other, it in a way demonstrates strategic learning on behalf of the parties based in the new 
values engendered by reform. As we have seen, limited increases in state funding were 
introduced in recognition of the argument that parties were struggling to fulfil their principal 
functions. Whilst the tradition of voluntarism remains, it is arguable that the recognition of 
the importance of parties (explicit in the Neill Committee report which prompted the reforms) 
and the acknowledgement that the state can play an enhanced role in party finance has made 
it more acceptable for both parties to argue for enhanced provision. And, whilst neither 
principal party argued for comprehensive funding in the Electoral Commission‟s 2004 
review, both agreed that an extension to cover some aspects of parties‟ work was desirable.  
 
In this respect the unintended consequences of reform and parties‟ strategic learning is clear. 
The new regulations were supposed to negate the need for state funding. In fact, the new 
transparency in party finance declarations made calls for state funding even louder, both from 
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within and outside parties. What is more, this led the Electoral Commission to re-examine the 
case for comprehensive state funding only two years after the original legislation had come 
into force. Parties have also demonstrated strategic learning. They have united around a 
theme of modest increases in state funding to facilitate particular party functions. This 
consensus did not exist prior to the extension of state funding post-Neill. Moreover, they have 
also both resisted calls to place caps on individual donations, noting that the success of actors 
like the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the Electoral Commission has been in 
part built on promoting reforms which have cross party support.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has highlighted the problems with assumptions underpinning party funding 
reform conceived as constitutional engineering along the lines of Katz and Mair‟s „Cartel 
Party‟ thesis. Firstly, the assumed predictability of cause and effect has been found wanting 
in many instances.  In both cases, the centrality of transparency to an optimal party funding 
regime has strongly influenced the reform process. The idea of a disjuncture between 
„internal‟ values of institutions and „external‟ values of wider society explains the impetus for 
funding reform in the context of sleaze and scandals. However, the aspirations in the French 
case have been unfulfilled. In France, the logic of appropriateness of actors within the system 
tended involve „occult‟ funding sources. The resilience of pre-existing corrupt norms and 
networks of French political finance has led to intentional laxity and loophole-seeking, 
rendering the transparency illusory, and the ceilings and donations regulations largely 
inoperable. Given the failure to institute a robust transparency regime, the reform process has 
had the perverse unintended consequence of allowing parties to claim a spurious probity for 
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their political funding given a highly visible and politically salient reform process, which has 
not eradicated the pre-existing dubious financial networks.  
 
In Britain, as we have seen, there was the perverse outcome of more disquiet surrounding 
donations, post-transparency. However, just as French parties continued to be lax in terms of 
compliance, British parties followed the logic of appropriateness by largely complying with 
the new legislation – at least, at first. Fisher (2001) shows that parties were determined not to 
fall foul of the new regulations in the general election, and notwithstanding the cases prior to 
the 2005 election, there was no real evidence that the spirit of compliance has been in any 
way diluted. Equally, the Electoral Commission has been keen to ensure that it works with 
the parties, rather than against them to enhance compliance. 
 
A second assumption that has proved difficult to sustain relates to the quality of information 
on which reform projects are based. Only more realistic assumptions about the necessary 
imperfection of the information can account for a range of often very significant unintended 
consequences of party funding reform unearthed in the comparative analysis presented here. 
The unintended consequences of reform in the French case served to exacerbate the problems 
of the fissiparous incentive structure of the French party system, leading to a proliferation of 
„parties‟, some founded with the sole purpose of recouping generous state funding. In the 
British case, the move to introduce transparency as a means of quelling public disquiet about 
party finance, initially at least had the opposite effect. Fuelled by circumstantial speculation, 
the greater transparency led to early calls for more reform, both in terms of donation caps and 
enhanced state funding. Indeed, the Electoral Commission review of the act focussed heavily 
on these two aspects and it is arguable that the significant re-emergence of state funding onto 
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the political agenda has been the major longer-term unintended consequence of the British 
reforms.  
 
The third deviation from assumptions underpinning the Cartel Party ideal-type relates to the 
degree of control over the process exerted by parties. In both cases, this has been seen to be 
less than complete. Other actors, be they the Electoral Commission in Britain, or the 
Constitutional Council, have had decisive impacts of the paths of reform in both cases. These 
bodies have sought to enhance the democratic probity of party funding arrangements, but the 
„optimal‟ notion of party democracy differs in the two cases. The French model of party 
democracy places more emphasis on multi-partyism, and as such contrasts with a 
Westminster Model more comfortable with two-party dominance. In relation to state funding, 
the policy corollary of this difference has been explicit „affirmative action‟ to advance 
smaller parties within the French party system, whilst the British reform process has not 
seriously contemplated such measures. The Constitutional Council, in upholding the principle 
of multi-partyism, perhaps unwittingly increased fragmentation within the French party 
system. This has been the most significant unintended consequence of the French reforms.  
 
One last note-worthy aspect of party funding reform processes under scrutiny here has been 
the reflexive relationship between agents and political funding structures. The French case 
showed two forms of „strategic learning‟ by actors, on the one hand it took the form of 
loophole seeking (for example by channelling funds through „personal‟ contributions to 
candidate‟s own campaigns, thus escaping donations and ceilings restrictions). On the other 
hand, agents succeeded in redesigning structures to increase room to manoeuvre after the 
strictest (1990) legislation proved too tight a constraint. Thus a degree of intentional laxity 
was re-introduced into the rolling reform programme through loophole insertion. Most 
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conspicuous was the deleting of the „even tacit‟ phrase from spending ceilings, rendering 
them largely inoperable, but also with the deliberate widening of the loophole permitting 
donations from parties to candidates in the 1993 legislation. In the British case, given the 
relative youth of the reforms, there have been fewer examples of strategic learning. 
Nevertheless, there has been some evidence in the readiness of the two major parties to more 
openly embrace targeted, but not comprehensive, state funding, made „legitimate‟ by its 
inclusion in the original reforms. And in 2005, some parties arguably manipulated the 
timetable for declaring donations.  
 
Overall, then, this analysis of party funding reform in France and Britain has demonstrated 
that constitutional engineering through party finance reform is a singularly inexact science, 
characterised by highly significant unintended consequences. These are largely due to the 
imperfect nature of information, the limited predictability of cause and effect, and the 
constraining influence of non-party actors, such as the Constitutional Council in France, and 
the Electoral Commission in Britain. 
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1
 Historically, no reliable data has been available regarding either French party membership 
levels or French party finances. This has made such claims impossible to verify 
2
 Repercussions continued into the late 90s, and in 1997 Henri Emmanuelli, Treasurer of the 
Party at the time of URBA, received a suspended 18 month jail sentence, and was deprived of 
his droits civiques  for 2 years. 
3
 Indeed, Doublet argues that contributions of members represent only 8.3% of the global 
resources of parties (1999: 68). The combination of increased expenditure and declining 
revenues exacerbated concerns surrounding vested interests ability to „buy‟ influence, for 
example over the allocation of public contracts, in return for the funds upon which parties are 
increasingly dependent. 
 
4
 The office of the Socialist Defence Minister was accused of permitted unlawful exports of 
arms to Iran in contravention of an export ban in return for kickbacks to the party from the 
arms company. 
5
 The former minister for co-operation who was tried for using the agency Carrefour du 
développement to divert large sums intended for African aid to fund his election campaigns. 
6
 Le Monde 
 „L'adoption des projets de loi sur le financement de la vie politique. Les députés 
socialistes se réfugient dans l'abstention‟ 06 February 1988 
 
7
 Conseil constitutionnel, Décision n° 89-271 DC, 11 January 1990. „Loi relative à la 
limitation des dépenses électorales et à la clarification du financement des activité politique‟ 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1989/89271dc.htm 
Accessed 11 May 2005. Author‟s translation.  
 
8
 Conseil constitutionnel, Décision du 29 mars 1994 „Observations du Conseil constitutionnel 
relatives aux élections législatives des 21 et 28 mars 1993‟ http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1994/940329.htm Accessed 11 May 2005. 
9
 One high profile example, centring on former Minister Michel Roussin, involves 
payments from companies bidding for school maintenance and building contracts in Ile-de-
France to the RPR between 1990 and 1995. See, for example, „La collusion des patrons, au 
procès des marchés d'Ile-de-France‟, Le Monde, 23 April 2005. 
 
10  For example, when business funding was again outlawed in 1995 (see below), the finances of the RPR in 
particular sustained a significant blow, suggesting, in the more transparent climate, not all their previous 
business donations found their way into the coffers by a more circuitous route. A further consideration may 
have been the record of the RPR Governments of the mid 1990s. 
11  For example, companies letting office space to parties at below market rates, or buying advertising space at 
inflated prices. Furthermore, cash contributions may go unrecorded, as may use of a company‟s assets - 
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cars, computers, phones and the like, during a campaign. Furthermore, of course, illegal donors will not be 
issued with a receipt. 
12  Nor is it an isolated example. As far as party transparency goes, there is no systematic tracing of the local 
activities of parties. Between 1990 and 1995, French party accounts often conflated individual and 
corporate donations – leaving the commission unable to ensure observance of ceilings. 
13
    There is evidence that the measures taken have not really enhanced the legitimacy of French political 
finance in the eyes of the French electorate. A study published in Le Monde in 2000 found that only 33 per 
cent of respondents felt there had been „some cleaning up of the financing of politics‟. Regarding the 
effectiveness of  spending ceilings and the outlawing of business funding, 62 per cent felt that there had „not 
really been any change‟. Le Monde „Scepticisme sur le financement des partis politiques‟, 05 October 2000. 
 
14  The most rigorous and stringent package passed in the „legislative incontinence‟ of the late 1980s and 1990s 
– which were subsequently „loosened‟ in key respects. 
15  In 1992, Prime Minister Bérégovoy declared his intention of „draining the abscess of corruption‟. He   
wanted to cut ties between business and politics, but failed due to widespread opposition. Instead, business   
donations capped at one quarter of resources spent by the party in the previous election. Disclosure requirements 
were strengthened, parties and candidates required to publish an „exhaustive‟ list of donor companies. However, 
the 1993 Sapin law was circumvented by large companies with lots of subsidiaries. 
16
 Conseil constitutionnel, Décision du 11 octobre 1995 „Décision du Conseil constitutionnel 
relative au compte de campagne de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, candidat à l'élection 
présidentielle des 23 avril et 7 mai 1995‟ http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1995/9525.htm accessed 11 May 2005. 
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Table 1 
French Party Finance Regulation Pre and Post reform 
 
 Pre- 1988 (beginning of reform process) After the 1988-95 reform process 
Donations  No caps on donations by individuals 
 Donations from companies de jure illegal for both giver and 
recipient, but de facto widespread. 
 1988 Law – Tax relief on donations to candidates, limited to 
20,000ff (€3,049) by individuals, 50,000ff (€7, 622) by 
organisations.  
 Donations over 2,000ff (€305) had to be by cheque, and cash 
cannot exceed 20% total funding. 
 Ambiguity over legality of corporate donations to parties. 
 1990 Law – Corporate donations legalised. Ceilings on both 
individual and corporate donations - Parties were entitled to 
receive 50,000ff (€7, 622) from individuals, and 500,000ff (€ 
76, 225) from corporate bodies per year. 
 Donations from parties to candidates not regulated. This major 
loophole was deliberately widened in the 1993 legislation. 
 1995 – Corporate donations made illegal once more 
Disclosure & 
Transparency 
 
 No infrastructure to ensure transparency 
 No disclosure requirements for individuals 
 No disclosure requirements for parties 
 Detailed annual accounts and donations declared to new 
National Commission on Campaign Accounts and Political 
Finance (CNCCFP) and published. Compelled revealing the 
identity of donors. 
 Declaration of „tacit‟ donations introduced in 1990 to tackle 
loopholes of 1988 act 
 „Tacit‟ donations subsequently excluded in 1994 
Foreign Donations  Foreign Donations Legal  Foreign donations banned in 1988 
Campaign 
Spending Ceilings 
 No campaign spending ceilings  1988 Law – spending ceilings established for legislative - 
500,000ff (€76, 225) per candidate and presidential (120m ff 
[E18.3m], rising to 140m [€21.3m] in the second ballot) 
elections. Campaign defined as 3 months before election 
 1990 Law – campaign period extended to one year. Raised 2nd 
round presidential ceiling to 160m ff. 
 1993 Law – Assemblée nationale ceilings revised (500, 000ff  
> 250,000ff [€76, 225 > 38,112]  per candidate plus 1ff 
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[€E0.15] per inhabitant – average total 350,000ff [€53, 357]) 
State Funding  parties only received minimum support – for poster 
campaigns, and a limited amount of airtime. 
 All funding subject to condition of submitting accounts 
 1988 Law – Lump sum reimbursement of electoral expenses 
extended significantly - calculated proportionate to seats won 
at election.  (5% threshold) 
 1990 Law – Calculation of state funding changed. Half to 
parties in parliament (relative to number of deputies - each 
worth 290,000 FF [€44,210] per year), half to parties fielding 
more than 75 candidates (each vote worth 11.9 FF [€1.8] per 
year).  
 Subsequently reduced to 50 constituencies; 5% threshold ruled 
unconstitutional 
 1995 – „compensatory‟ increase in state funding when  
business funding made illegal once more. Electoral expenses 
reimbursed rose from 5% to 50% of the ceiling on 
expenditure.   
 The number of parties eligible for funding  (€ 1.8 per vote 
cast) rose from 23 in 1997 to 32 in 2002. 
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Table 2 
British Party Finance Regulation Pre and Post 2000 
 
 Pre- 2000 Post 2000 Changes 
Donations  No limits on donations size 
 Trade unions required to ballot members on 
continuation of political fund (from which party 
affiliation is paid) every ten years since 1984 
 Shareholders to be balloted prior to corporate 
donations being made.  
Disclosure & Transparency 
 
 
 Legal requirement on disclosure for companies 
and trade unions 
 No disclosure requirements for individuals 
 No disclosure requirements for parties 
 Donations in excess of £5,000 (€7,509) nationally 
and £1,000 (€1,502) now regularly declared to 
new Electoral Commission 
 Declaration includes „in kind‟ payments. 
 Anonymous donations effectively banned 
Foreign Donations  Foreign donations permitted  Foreign Donations banned 
Campaign Spending Ceilings  Restricted to constituency level 
 Campaign period in effect defined as time at 
which parliament dissolved 
 Based on 1883  
 Spending limits apply only to Westminster 
elections 
 National campaign spending limits set (£30,000 
[€45,051] per contested constituency) – 
previously only constituency limits 
 Campaign period defined as 365 days before 
election 
 Spending limits for Westminster and non-
Westminster elections 
State Funding  Limited financial support for opposition parties in 
parliament („Short‟ money) since 1975 
 All other state aid is „in kind‟ 
 
 Limited increase in state funding – remains 
modest in comparison 
 Increase in parliamentary support („Short‟ money) 
 Establishment of Policy Development Fund  
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